CHECKBOOK JOURNALISM, FREE SPEECH,
AND FAIR TRIALS
ScoTr C. PUGHt
INTRODUCTION
OnJune 14, 1994, the Los Angeles coroner's office revealed that
Nicole Brown Simpson, O.J. Simpson's former wife, and Ronald
Goldman died as a result of "'sharp force injuries,'" possibly knifeinflicted stab wounds.1 Not long after O.J. Simpson's arrest in
connection with the murders, 2 an employee and a part-owner of a
Los Angeles cutlery store, Jose Camacho and Allen Wattenberg,
alleged that Simpson had recently visited their store and had
purchased a fifteen-inch knife.3 They also claimed that Simpson
had requested that they sharpen the knife before turning it over to
him.4
Although Camacho and Wattenberg testified at Simpson's
preliminary hearing, they had previously shared their information
with the public by selling their stories to the National Enquirer.5
Although tabloid media publications often pay for stories, Camacho
and Wattenberg received an uncommon $12,500 in exchange for
their story.6 After criminal proceedings against Simpson began, his
defense counsel moved to dismiss Camacho, claiming that his
acceptance of the money made him untrustworthy.7 When that
motion was denied, Simpson's defense team responded by assailing
Camacho's credibility through vigorous questioning about the
transactions with the tabloid.8

t B.A. 1992, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. This Comment owes a lot to the thoughtful suggestions of
Hilary Siegel and to the patience and support ofJo Anne.
' Brian McGrory, Simpson Seen as Prime Suspect, BOSTON GLOBE,June 15, 1994, at
1, 22.

2 See David Ferrell & Eric Malnic, LAPD Criticizedfor Leniency in Handling Case,
L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1994, at Al.
s See Henry Weinstein, Free-SpendingTabloidMedia CausingJudicialConcerns, L.A.
TIMES, July 2, 1994, at Al, A2.
"See B. Drummond Ayres,Jr., Store Clerk Tells Court Simpson Bought 15-Inch Knife
Weeks Before the Killings, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1994, at A20.
' See Weinstein, supra note 3, at Al, A2.
6 See id. at Al.
See World News Saturday: Simpson Case Media-Paid Witnesses' Credibility (ABC
television broadcast, July 2, 1994).
8 For instance, Simpson's attorney asked: "'You were like a businessman, and you

(1739)

1740 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1739

Shortly after Camacho and Wattenberg made their deals with
the National Enquirer, a witness named Jill Shively surfaced, also
claiming to possess information that inculpated Simpson. She
alleged that she saw Simpson speeding through the streets near the
murder scene "like a madman"9 in his now infamous white Bronco
on the night the victims were killed.1" Like Camacho and Wattenberg, Shively first opted to tell her story to tabloid media organizations and accepted payments for it-$5000 from the television
tabloid Hard Copy and $2600 from the Star, a supermarket tabloid.11 When the prosecution learned Shively had taken money for
her story, it dropped her from its witness list.12
The actions of Camacho, Wattenberg, and Shively13 represent a
new species of an old problem: extrajudicial statements by trial
participants. Paying individuals for information, known as "checkbook journalism, " " is a relatively new practice which entails its own
peculiar package of risks to fair trials.15 By taking money from a
tabloid media outlet in exchange for information about which she
will testify in court, a witness may subvert a trial's integrity and a
defendant's right to a fair trial.
The actions of Camacho, Wattenberg, and Shively probably represent the most recent and most conspicuous examples of checkbook journalism's foray into criminal proceedings. The Simpson
case, however, is certainly not the first time checkbook journalism
has played a part in a criminal prosecution or investigation. Other
prominent examples include the William Kennedy Smith trial,16

wanted to sell your story to the highest bidder, didn't you?'" Robin Clark, Tabloids
Are Paying but at a Cost: Journalism by Checkbook Is a Big Problem in High-Profile Cases,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 3, 1994, at Cl, C8 (quoting Robert Shapiro, one of Simpson's
attorneys).
9
Id.
1
oSee Weinstein, supra note 3, at A2.
1 See id.
12See Clark, supra note 8, at C8; Weinstein, supra note 3, at A2.
's Simpson's friend Al Cowlings may also be added to the list of witnesses seeking
to profit by selling information about the case. On February 7, 1995, Cowlings
announced that he will write a book detailing his long-standing friendship with
Simpson. Cowlings also promised that the book will discuss the infamous freeway
chase preceding Simpson's arrest. See Debbie Howlett, Simpson Pal Cowlings to Write
Book, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1995, at IA.
14The mainstream media tends to use this term pejoratively. This Comment does
not use the term in any pejorative sense, but only as a shorthand way of denominating the practice of paying individuals for information.
15 See infra part II.A (examining three ways in which checkbook journalism may
imperil a defendant's right to a fair trial).
16During the course of Smith's prosecution on rape charges, three other women
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the Pamela Smart trial,' 7 the Jim Bakker trial,18 the Amy Fisher
20
trial, 9 and the Michael Jackson investigation.
Out-of-court statements by criminal trial participants can mar a
trial's integrity and thus undermine a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial. 21 They can similarly undercut public faith in the
came forward to assert that Smith had exhibited similar behavior toward them.
Although the women sold this information to different media outlets, only one of
them agreed to testify against Smith in court. Smith's attorney forced her to admit
that she had received $40,000 from A CurrentAffair in exchange for her story and
used this evidence to attack her motives and credibility. See Weinstein, supra note 3,
at A2; WDH-TV News: Turning up the Heat (CBS affiliate, WDH-TV, television
broadcast, Feb. 6, 1992).
'7 This trial was a macabre case in which the defendant convinced her 15-year-old
lover to murder her 24-year-old husband in the foyer of their apartment building.
Key witnesses were paid for information they possessed about the case. See Jerry
Miller, Smart MurderCase Attracts Attentionfrom Hollywood, UNION LEADER (Manches-

ter, N.H.), Oct. 8, 1990, at 9.
" In a paid interview with former Bakker mistressJessica Hahn, Playboy broke the
story that led to Bakker's eventual downfall from his ministry and to his conviction
on fraud charges. See Art Harris & Michael Isikoff, Jessica Hahn, on the Defensive,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1987, at C1.
19 In this case, Amy Fisher, a 16-year-old girl, went to the home of her loverJoey
Buttafuoco, and shot his wife, Maryjo Buttafuoco, in her face after the love affair had
gone sour. The tabloid media paid for a great deal of information during the course
of Fisher's trial. For instance, a Long Island man produced a videotape which contained scenes of him and Fisher in a sexual encounter. A CurrentAffair bought the
video. When Fisher was released on bail, a former boyfriend secretly recorded a
conversation in which Fisher seriously damaged her credibility as a witness. A Current
Affair also bought this tape, which resulted in Fisher's lawyers advising her not to take
the stand in her defense and in law enforcement authorities deciding not to pursue
an investigation ofJoey Buttafuoco. A neighbor of the Buttafuocos secretly recorded
a conversation she had with Maryjo shortly after the shooting, fetching $16,000 from
Hard Copy for the tape. The biggest profit-takers, however, were the Buttafuocos
themselves. A television tabloid paid them $500,000 for exclusive interview rights,
and Tri-Star Pictures closed a deal purchasing the rights to a TV movie that could net
the Buttafuocos as much as $1 million. See Craig Gordon & Sylvia Adcock, Amy &
Joey: Crime Pays in Big Way, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 22, 1993, at 6.
'o While the investigation concerningalleged molestation ofjuveniles was pending,
Blanca Francia, one ofJackson's former maids, accepted money from Hard Copy in
exchange for her story. See William Hamilton, The Muck-a-Mucks of TabloidJournalism,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1993, at Cl, C13; Lawyers Talk to Maid Who Said Jackson Was
Nude with Boys, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1993, at 5. Francia told the tabloid "that she
sawJackson bathing in the nude with at least two young boys." Id. at 5. The National
Enquirer purchased the report of the caseworker who first interviewed Jackson's
accuser. See Clark, supra note 8, at C8. According to Jackson's lawyer, one reason
that the civil case was settled out of court and that no charges were brought by the
state was that the stories sold by the witnesses to the tab-loids were inconsistent with,
and more sensational than, the accounts those witnesses had previously given in
sworn depositions. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at A2.
21 See infra part LA (discussing the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial).

1742 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1739

the justice system and contribute to the unreliability of verdicts. To
guard against these risks, trial judges have employed a variety of
devices, including extensive voir dire of jurors, 22 postponement of
trials, 23 change of venue, 24 change of venire, 25 jury sequestra28
27
tion, 26 special jury instructions, and imposition of gag orders.

' Many of the following examples are drawn from Robert S. Stephen, Note,
PrejudicialPublicity Surroundinga CriminalTrial: What a TrialCourt CanDo to Ensure
a FairTrial in the Faceof a "MediaCircus", 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1063 (1992), which
also analyzes the effectiveness of these devices. On the voir dire measure, see, for
example, Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 728-32 (7th Cir.) (employing voir
dire), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969); People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 315-19
(Ct. App. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977); Khaalis v. United States, 408
A.2d 313, 335 (D.C. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 1092 (1980); State v. Hale, 172
A.2d 631, 634 (Me. 1961) (same); see also Robert M. Takasugi,Juy Selection in a High
Profile Case: United States v. DeLorean, 40-AM. U. L. REV. 837, 840 (1991)
(summarizingJudge Takasugi's account of the devices he used-including voir dire-to
safeguard John DeLorean's Sixth Amendment rights during his prosecution on
federal drug charges).
23 A postponement is also referred to as an "adjournment" or "continuance."
See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42, 321 (6th ed. 1990). For an example of a case in which
this device was used to mitigate prejudicial publicity, see United States v. Dioguardi,
147 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
24 Change of venue attempts to remedy the prejudicial effects of an extrajudicial
statement or other prejudicial information by removing the trial to an untainted
location. A recent use of this measure which garnered a great deal of public
attention was the Rodney King beating trial, in which the judge moved the trial of
four L.A.P.D. officers from Los Angeles to Simi Valley. See Reynolds Holding, Trial's
Location May Have Affected Verdict, S.F. CHRON., May 1, 1992, at A14; see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 21(a) ("The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the
proceeding.., to another district.., if the court is satisfied that there exists in the
district where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant
that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law
for holding court in that district."). The issue of venue may approach constitutional
proportions in criminal cases. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963)
(stating that in some situations denial of a defendant's request for a change of venue
amounts to a violation of defendant's constitutional rights); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 719-20 (1961) (discussing a constitutional challenge to a state statute that allows
only one change of venue).
21 Change of venire involves enlarging the panel of prospective jurors, calling in
a new panel, or importing a panel from an area not suffused with prejudice against
the defendant. See G. Michael Fenner &James L. Koley, The Rights of the Pressand
the Closed Court CriminalProceeding,57 NEB. L. REV. 442, 497 (1978).
26 Ajudge may sequester ajury during the course of trial proceedings, usually by
isolatingjurors in a hotel, to prevent them from being tampered with or exposed to
publicity. Judge Lance Ito took this step in the ongoing prosecution of O.J. Simpson.
See Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Ito Tells Jurors They Will Be Sequestered, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1995, at Bi. Other high-profile cases in which juries have been sequestered
include the Charles Manson case, the Rodney King beating case, and the Reginald
Denny beating case. See Stephanie Simon & Ralph Frammolino, Despite Perks,
Sequestration Is a Guilded Cage, Jurors Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at Al.
27

Ajudge may "issue special jury instructions that emphasize the presumption of
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In September, 1994, the California state legislature, in response
to the conduct of witnesses in the Simpson case, 29 addressed the
problem of tabloid-paid witnesses in criminal cases by enacting
legislation prohibiting the sale of any "information obtained as a
result of witnessing [an] event or occurrence" that might pertain to
a criminal prosecution."
California Assembly Speaker Willie
innocence and the need to disregard public sentiment." Terri A. Belanger, Note,
Symbolic Expression in the Courtroom: The Right to a FairTrail Versus Freedom of Speech,
62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 353 (1994); see also Close-It Enters. v. Weinberger, 407
N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (App. Div. 1978) (stating that jury instructions can cure the effects
of potential prejudice).
28 Gag orders raise First Amendment concerns, and many of them have been
invalidated by appellate courts on that basis. See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v.
Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 1986) (invalidating trial court's order
limiting press contact with former jurors as impermissibly overbroad in violation of
the First Amendment); Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 599 (9th
Cir. 1985) (invalidating the trial court's order barring attorneys from making
statements related to the case to the media as impermissibly overbroad in violation
of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); Rodgers v. United States
Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a protective order
prohibiting counsel from disclosing information obtained via discovery was an
impermissible prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms); CBS,
Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 240-41 (6th Cir. 1975) (invalidating a gag order which
prevented parties from discussing the case with the media because it did not
overcome the presumption against constitutional validity of prior restraints upon First
Amendment freedoms); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242,249 (7th
Cir. 1975) (invalidating, as unconstitutionally overbroad, a district court rule and
disciplinary rule of the American Bar Association that prohibited attorneys from
making out-of-court statements about pending or imminent litigation, if such
statements might reasonably "interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due
administration ofjustice"), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
Some gag orders, however, have been sustained on appeal. See e.g., In re Dow
Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 611-12 (2d Cir.) (finding that only a gag order could "stop
the grand jury leaks and the publicity prejudicial to defendants' rights"), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 946 (1988); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781
F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding "that restraints on statements of trial
participants.., do not infringe freedom of press under the first amendment"). For
commentaries on the varying standards courts have used to review gag orders, see
Mark R. Stabile, Note, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly
Publicized CriminalCase?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337, 349-54 (1990); Michael E. Swartz, Note,
Trial ParticipantSpeech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1411, 1414-15 (1990); Ren6 L. Todd, Note, A PriorRestraint by Any Other Name:
TheJudicialResponse to Media Challengesof Gag Orders Directed at TrialParticipants,88
MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1176-81 (1990).
I See Governor Signs Bills Barring Witnessesfrom Selling Stories, Reuters, Sept. 26,
1994, at I [hereinafter GovernorSigns Bills], availablein LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File.
SoCAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(b) (West Supp. 1995). The statute states in relevant
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Brown, the bill's principal author, repeatedly stressed that the state's
checkbook journalism law does not prevent witnesses from giving
information to any media outlet they choose, but only from
receiving payment for doing so.31 The state legislature justified the
measure on Sixth Amendment grounds, claiming that it was
necessary to ensure a fair trial for criminal defendants."2
This Comment analyzes California's statutory effort to accommodate the competing First and Sixth Amendment interests. Part
I explores the parameters and underlying rationales of both the
First and Sixth Amendments and the potential points of conflict
between them. Part II begins by considering ways in which the
statute might serve Sixth Amendment interests and, then, shows
how the statute's attempt to serve these interests places a burden on
free speech rights. This Part explains why the California legislative

A person who is a witness to an event or occurrence that he or she knows
is a crime or who has personal knowledge of facts that he or she knows or
reasonably should know may require that person to be called as a witness
in a criminal prosecution shall not accept or receive, directly or indirectly,
any money or its equivalent in consideration for providing information
obtained as a result of witnessing the event or occurrence or having
personal knowledge of the facts.
Id. Violations of this statute are punishable by fines of up to three times the amount
the witness received for her story and by imprisonment of up to six months. See id.
§ 132.5(e).
California also prohibits jurors from receiving money in exchange for any
information about the trial. See id. § 1122. This Comment, however, deals only with
those provisions which restrict the ability of witnesses, notjurors, to receive payment
for information.
"' See Bouncing CheckbookJournalism,HOLLYWOOD REP.,July 27, 1994, at 7 ("I am

not barring them from saying it; I'm barring them from getting paid for it." (quoting
California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown)); Jerry Gillam, Brown Says Courts Would
Uphold Bill on PaidInterviews, L.A. TIMES,July 27, 1994, at A3 ("They [witnesses] can
still talk to the press, but they can't make a deal." (quoting Brown)); see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 13 2.5(a) (indicating that the legislature finds that disclosure of such
information for valuable consideration contravenes important state interests and that

the statute "is not intended to prevent any person from disseminating any
information or opinion").
2 See Willie L. Brown, Jr., Money Taints Trial Process: Witnesses Who Sell Their
Stories Can Compromise Trial, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1994, at 10A (relying on the Sixth

Amendment to justify the measure); Brown Discusses Proposalto Outlaw Checkbook
Journalism(CNN television broadcast,July 27, 1994) (same). The State also appealed
to its interest in assuring the reliability of verdicts and in shoring up public
confidence in thejudicial system. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) (declaring that the
practice of checkbook journalism in the context of criminal proceedings "threatens
to erode the reliability of verdicts" and "creates an appearance of injustice that is
destructive of public confidence"). Thesejustifications are derivatives of the central
Sixth Amendment justification.

1995]

CHECKBOOKJOURNALISM

1745

effort does not achieve the Supreme Court's avowed aim of
resolving conflicts between the First and Sixth Amendments
"without essentially abrogating one right or the other.""3 Part II
also proposes two alternate solutions for achieving the statute's
goals while maintaining an acceptable balance between the rights in
the First and Sixth Amendments. Finally, Part III concludes that
these alternatives achieve a solution that is more respectful of
traditional First Amendment policy considerations than the current
statutory solution promulgated by the California legislature.
I. Two

CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

One of the principal guarantees of the Sixth Amendment is the
right to trial by an impartialjury. This Part begins by explaining the
meaning that the Supreme Court has assigned to that concept and
then details the methods and feasibility of showing jury prejudice.
The discussion next considers the First Amendment right to free
speech and elucidates two common policy justifications for this
right. It also explores the relevance to First Amendment jurisprudence of distinguishing content-neutral from content-based
restrictions on speech. Finally, this Part concludes by surveying
ways in which the rights in the First and Sixth Amendments can
conflict with one another, focusing on how the Court has attempted
to accommodate such conflicts.
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Fair Trial

The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant the
right to a public trial by an impartial jury.3 4 Courts and commentators commonly refer to this as the right to a "fair trial."35 The
impaneling of an impartial jury is necessary but not sufficient to
assure that a defendant's fair trial right is respected. 6 The state
s Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 612 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.").
' See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) ("The
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant certain fair
trial rights .... ."); Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: The Difficult Reconciliation of a
FairTrial and a Free Press in Modern American Society, CHAMPION, July 1994, at 4, 5-6
("[F]airness is the preeminent value advanced by the Sixth Amendment's safeguard

of a fair trial by an impartial jury.").
' See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (stating that the

obligation to provide a fair trial "lies in the first instance with the trial judge");
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must also ensure that the right is maintained throughout the course
of trial proceedings.17 The central value served by the Sixth
Amendment is fairness. All of the protections guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, such as an impartial jury,"8 the right of confrontation, 9 and the right to counsel,4" share the property of promoting fairness in adjudication.
The text of the Sixth Amendment does not explain what
constitutes juror impartiality.4
A certain tension pervades the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on the Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial. The Court has characterized it as "the most fundamental of all freedoms"42 and as a right "essential to the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights."4 3 The Court has even
asserted that the fair trial right must be maintained "at all costs."44
Endorsements of this kind might lead one to conclude that the
Court would allow the fair trial right to trump other constitutional

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 (1976) (declaring that states have an "obligation
to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury").
s7 The government must ensure that nojuror is subjected to information that will
make her biased at any time before rendering a verdict. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594
F.2d 356, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[A] properly drawn rule restricting lawyer's
comments about pending criminal prosecutions can be justified by the need to
protect the right to a fair jury trial."); Stephen, supra note 22, at 1082 ("[C]ourt[s]
must maintain impartiality by continuously and carefully monitoring the trial
proceedings and any outside activity that may prejudice the jurors.").
" See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961) (noting that a trial cannot be fair
if thejury is not impartial). For further discussion of the values behind the guarantee
of trial by jury, see infra notes 156-59.
9
See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) ("There is something deep in
human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between an accused and an
accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.'" (quoting Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965))).
4
' See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 684 (1984) (noting the guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel exists "in order to protect the fundamental right to
a fair trial"). See generally ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE at ix (1992) (stating that a fair trial is "the core ideal" of
the Sixth Amendment); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 279 (1991) ("Some parts of the Bill of Rights, such as the 'fair trial'
provisions, promote fairness ... ."). Fairness is not, however, the policy or value
traditionally served by the First Amendment, and it may work in opposition to the
policies or values animating the First Amendment. Id. at 278-79.
41See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4' Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
4 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976); see also Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[W]hen irreconcilable conflicts arise, the right to a fair trial ... must take precedence over the right
to make comments about pending litigation... if such comments are apt to seriously
threaten the integrity of the judicial process."), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
44 Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
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rights to the extent they are in conflict, and that the Court would
tolerate only minimal juror partiality.
In fact, the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence does not
bear out either of these suppositions. The Court has affirmatively
indicated that no hierarchy exists among the rights enumerated in
the first ten amendments.4 5 Hence, notwithstanding the language
in some of the Court's opinions, the right to a fair trial cannot
simply trump other potentially conflicting constitutional guarantees.46
Furthermore, the Court has consistently relaxed the permissible
amount of prejudicial information to which ajuror may be exposed,
as well as the permissible firmness with which she may hold a
preconceived opinion about the case or the defendant. The Court
has never insisted that a jury have no knowledge of or opinion
about the defendant or her alleged crime. 7 A juror, therefore, can

"' See NebraskaPress Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 561 ("The authors of the Bill of Rights did
not undertake to assign priorities as between First and Sixth Amendment rights,
ranking one as superior to the other.... [I]t is not for us to rewrite the Constitution
by undertaking what they declined to do.").
46
See id. The Supreme Court has never accepted Justice Burger's solution of a
simple hierarchical approach in which First Amendment rights always yield to Sixth
Amendment rights. For Burger's views, see Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501,508 (1984) ("[Although] no right ranks higher than the right of the accused
to a fair trial .... the primacy of the accused's right is difficult to separate from the
right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.");
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (referring to a
defendant's right to a fair trial as "superior" to the right of the press and the public
to attend a trial); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) (noting the difficult
but often unavoidable judicial task of prioritizing constitutional rights). For an
example of an appellate court apparently accepting Burger's approach, see In re Dow
Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.) ("When the exercise of free press rights
actually tramples upon Sixth Amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield
to the latter."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
Likewise, the Court has never taken the position that First Amendment rights are
inviolate and always trump Sixth Amendment rights. See Shepherd v. Florida, 341
U.S. 50, 52-53 (1951) (noting that freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment must
sometimes be restrained in order to protect the right to a fair trail); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331,366 (1946) (Frankfurter,J., concurring) ("In securing freedom
of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or
juries. That is no more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exercise
of the right to vote.").
" As far back as the celebrated treason trial of Aaron Burr, ChiefJustice Marshall
rejected the argument put forth by Burr that the Sixth Amendment entitled him to
a panel ofjurors who were "perfectly indifferent and free from prejudice." United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14 ,962 g). In 1878, the Court
reiterated its view that such a standard would be unrealistic and unworkable. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878).
The notion that a jury can be impartial only if it is totally ignorant of the
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be simultaneously impartial and opinionated.
The Supreme Court offered further guidance as to what
constitutes disqualifying bias in the case of Irvin v. Dowd.4 8 In Irvin,
the Court reiterated its view that mere familiarity with "the facts
and issues" involved in a case does not by itself amount to partiality.4 9 Rather, a juror is impartial for constitutional purposes if
she is able to "lay aside [her] impression or opinion" and "render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court."5" The defendant has the burden of proving that any particular juror does not
meet the standard by showing actual bias.51 One commentator has
described this burden as "tremendous" because "it is up to the
accused to identify the bias, demonstrate its intensity, and convince
the trial judge that the jurors' 'impressions' are not light but are
firmly etched within the recesses of the mind."5"
However, the Irvin Court left open a small window for defendants seeking to prove juror bias by creating a second category of
bias which also violates the Sixth Amendment: presumptive bias.
Where a "'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' [against the
defendant]... throughout the community" is revealed, a presump-

defendant's background and the crime she is alleged to have committed drew biting
criticism from Mark Twain: "We have a criminal jury system which is superior to any
other in the world; and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding twelve
men every day who don't know anything and can't read." MARK TWAIN, SKETCHES
NEW AND OLD 235 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1899) (1875). Twain also stated,
[W]hen a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears
that testimony given under solemn oath will outweigh, with him, street talk
and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred
jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity ... Why could
not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal
chance with fools and miscreants?
2 MARKTWAIN, ROUGHING IT 56-57 (Author's Nat'l ed., Harper & Bros. 1913) (1871).
For an argument that informed citizens generally make the best jurors, see
Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an ImpartialJurorin an Age of Mass Media?,
40 AM. U. L. REv. 631, 656-60 (1991).
49

366 U.S. 717 (1961).
See id. at 723.

50 Id.

" See id. ("The affirmance of the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows
the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the
presumption of partiality, the juror need not be set aside."); see also Murphy v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (noting that "it remains open to the defendant to
demonstrate" actual bias on the part of a juror (emphasis added)).
52 Garcia, supra note 35, at 9 (commenting on the Reynolds case upon which the
Irvin Court relied for its conclusion that ajuror is sufficiently impartial if she can set
aside her impressions or opinions and base herjudgment on the evidence presented
in court).
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dion of partiality may properly arise.5" Even when jurors profess
an ability to set aside their preconceptions regarding a defendant's
guilt, it may, depending on the circumstances surrounding the case,
be presumed that the jurors' claims of impartiality are untrustworthy and, therefore, that the defendant cannot or did not receive a
54
fair trial.
Lower courts applying the doctrines articulated in Irvin have
interpreted them as affording the defendant two avenues for
proving that her jury was or will be impartial. One possibility is that
she can rely on voir dire testimony and other evidence to prove that
ajuror was actually biased against her. Alternatively, she can argue
that the circumstances surrounding her trial are so prejudicial that
a presumption of juror partiality is warranted. 55
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases, Murphy v. Florida5" and
Patton v. Yount,5" cast serious doubt on the continued viability of
the presumptive bias prong. In both cases, jurors and their
communities were exposed to extremely prejudicial, inadmissible
information about the defendants."
Both defendants were
convicted and subsequently challenged their convictions on
presumptive bias grounds. 9 Distinguishing earlier cases, the Court
refused to infer a presumption of juror bias in either case.6 0 The
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727 (citations omitted).
54 See id. at 728.
" See generally Minow & Gate, supra note 47, at 642-43 (collecting cases in which
courts have discussed actual and presumptive bias and applied the two-part Irvin test).
421 U.S. 794 (1975).
57 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
' In Murphy, jurors had knowledge of the defendant's prior convictions for
murder and robbery, including his notorious heist of the Star of India sapphire from
a museum in New York. See Murphy, 421 U.S at 795-97. They were also exposed to
extensive news accounts about the crimes for which he was then on trial. See id.
Patton involved the retrial of a defendant on the charges of rape and murder of an
18-year-old high school student. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1026-28. The defendant's
initial conviction was overturned after it was determined that the confession used
against him in the original trial was illegally obtained. See id. Four years later, media
coverage of the defendant's second trial resulted in wide circulation of the following
facts: that the defendant had previously been convicted of murder, that he had
confessed, and that he had asserted a temporary insanity defense during the first trial.
See id. As one pair of commentators put it, "it would be difficult to imagine a case
in which prejudice could more easily be proven or presumed." Minow & Gate, supra
note 47, at 645.
'9 See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1028-29; Murphy, 421 U.S. at 797.
6o See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1040 (finding that the trial was fair); Murphy, 421 U.S. at
803 (same). In both cases, the Court noted that the time between the prejudicial
publicity and the actual trials diminished any effects of the publicity. See Patton,467
U.S. at 1032; Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802.
5s
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Court did not explicitly repudiate presumptive bias as a means of
proving a violation of the right to a fair trial, but its refusal to find
presumptive bias in either case led commentators to question
whether that prong of the test for juror impartiality is still good
law.61 At the very least, these decisions force one to conclude that
the "standard for presuming prejudice may be impossible to
satisfy."62 Therefore, the difficulty of proving presumed or actual
juror partiality, like other Sixth Amendment limitations recognized
by the Court,6" makes a particular defendant's task of proving an
infringement of her right to a fair trial quite formidable."
B. The First Amendment Right to Free Speech
The following section lays the groundwork for Parts II and III,
which explain the legal and policy failures of the California statute,
by briefly summarizing First Amendment legal doctrine and policy
65
theory. After describing the two major theoretical justifications
61

See, e.g., Minow & Cate, supra note 47, at 643 (construing these cases as

eliminating the presumptive bias prong and requiring actual bias before a fair trial
violation will be found).
62 Id. at 646 (footnote omitted); see also Garcia, supranote 35, at 10 (describing the
task of showing presumptive bias as a "herculean exploit").
65 To prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, a
defendant must demonstrate that her attorney was highly inadequate and responsible
for committing serious errors. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)
(holding that the attorney's incompetence must rise to the level at which "the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result"). Similarly, at a joint trial, a
codefendant's confession that clearly implicates another defendant, as long as it does
so only inferentially, is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. See Richardson
v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-11 (1987) (holding that only a confession that facially
incriminates another defendant violates the Confrontation Clause); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (providing the right to confront witnesses).
"This survey is not a criticism of the way the Court has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment, but rather is simply meant to lay the groundwork for an evaluation of
whether the harms against which California has purportedly acted to protect are the
kinds of harms which might justify an abridgement of free expression. For an
argument that the Court's Sixth Amendmentjurisprudence is insufficiently solicitous
of defendants' rights, see generally Garcia, supra note 35.
65 Other notable justifications for freedom of expression include the individual
self-fulfillment rationale, the checking rationale, and the safety-valve rationale. See
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (discussing
the safety-valve rationale); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in Fiwt Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 521 (discussing the checking rationale); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (discussing the safety-valve
rationale); Thomas Scanlon, A Theoy of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972) (discussing the self-fulfillment rationale). This Comment focuses on the
marketplace of ideas and self-governance theories of the First Amendment, both
because they are historically dominant (in the decisions of the Supreme Court as well
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for freedom of expression, this discussion turns to an explanation
of the important legal doctrine governing free speech jurisprudence.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas Rationale
The oldest and perhaps most popular justification for freedom
of speech is that truth is best attained through free trade in
ideas.6 6 The foundation of this rationale is the notion that speech
achieves truth and that the fewer restrictions that are placed upon
speech, the more likely it is to discover the truth.67 On the
Supreme Court, Holmes and Brandeis were the most ardent and
eloquent defenders of this view. As Holmes wrote in his famous
Abrams dissent,
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe ... that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
68
of the market.
In developing its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has consistently relied upon the logic of the marketplace of
ideas. 69

as in the academic literature) and because they provide the most insight into the
issues discussed. The one exception is a brief note on the congruence between the
arguments presented here and the "checking rationale" of the First Amendment. See
infra note 194.
" Milton first gave voice to this view in Areopagitica. See JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGrriCA 51-52 (John W. Hales ed., London, Oxford University Press 3d ed.
1882) (1644) ("Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
wors [sic] in a free and open encounter?"). Later, the marketplace of ideas rationale
would serve as the heart ofJohn Stuart Mill's classic work, On Liberty. For further discussion and criticism of this justification for freedom of speech, see, for example, C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-24 (1989) (discussing some
frailties of the theory); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
15-34 (1982) (discussing the value of truth); Kent Greenawalt, FreeSpeechJustifications,
89 COLUM. L. REV 119, 130-41 (1989) (discussing the merits of truth discovery).
67
See Stanley lngber, The Marketplaceof Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 3, 5 (explaining that this theory of free expression is patterned after a laissez-faire
economic theory which asserts that "desirable economic conditions are best promoted
by a free market systems," rather than government regulation, and stating that "[the
marketplace of ideas] theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited
by governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth").
' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting); see
also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Framers "believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth");
Gitlow
69 v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes,J, dissenting) (citing Abrams).
See BAKER, supra note 66, at 7-12 (reviewing numerous opinions in which
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2. The Self-Governance Rationale
Another leading justification for the First Amendment, developed most forcefully by Alexander Meiklejohn, is that a democratic
system requires the protection of speech relating to issues of public
interest or, defined broadly, political matters.7 ' For the people to
truly govern themselves, this theory contends, they must be free to
71
listen to arguments on all sides of any matter of public concern.
In short, if it is the people who exercise control by way of the
political process in a democracy, that is, if they are to decide which
policies the nation shall pursue, and by which means, then the
people must make fully informed and knowledgeable decisions. The
First Amendment, by prohibiting the exclusion of any speech
relevant in this regard, assures that "all facts and interests relevant
72
to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented."
In the seminal case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 73 the Supreme Court at least partially adopted the Meiklejohn interpretation
of the First Amendment. Sullivan was brought by a public official
of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed to have been libeled when
a group of students and clergymen published, in the New York Times,
an advertisement critical of the city's treatment of civil rights
marketplace imagery dominates the Court's discussions of free speech).
70

See

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-

GOVERNMENT 1-27 (1948).

71 "[T]he vital point, as stated negatively, is that no suggestion of policy shall be
denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than another." Id. at
26. There is a wealth of commentary both defending and attacking this theory of the
First Amendment. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 66, at 25-33 (comparing political
speech with the marketplace of ideas theory); Lilian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendment
and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L.
REV. 299,304-22 (1978) (finding fault with the then-prevailing political speech view);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20-35 (1971) (agreeing in part with Meiklejohn's theory); Zechariah Chafee,Jr., Book
Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949) (reviewing MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 70, and
defending his views); SCHAUER, supranote 66, at 35-46 (explaining and distinguishing
Meiklejohn's argument).
7 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 70, at 25.
Dr. Meiklejohn once explained his
understanding of the First Amendment in the following way:
Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom unabridged
by our agents. Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them.
Over our governing, they have no power. Over their governing, we have
sovereign power.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245,

257.

73

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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advocates.74 The Court set aside the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Alabama in favor of Mr. Sullivan and went on to establish
75
a very tough standard for public official plaintiffs in libel actions.
More importantly, the Court rested its holding on the notion that
the basic aim of the First Amendment is to foster an "unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes."76 Justice Brennan, who authored the opinion, understood Sullivan as implicitly rejecting earlier justifications of the First
Amendment, such as the "clear and present danger" test, the
"redeeming social value" test, and "balancing" tests.77 He also
noted that the opinion was consistent with Meiklejohn's theory of
78
the First Amendment.
Although Sullivan literally applies to libel cases only, Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., the most prominent First Amendment commentator of his time, predicted that its logic would "follow a dialectic
progression from public official to government policy to public
policy to matters in the public domain."79 The self-governance
rationale has since been applied by the Court in almost every First
Amendment context, suggesting that Professor Kalven was right."0
74 See id. at 256-65.
"' See id. at 283 (requiring public officials bringing libel actions to prove that false
statements about them were made knowingly or with reckless disregard of the
statement's
truth or falsity).
76
1Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). The Court
also stated that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and ...it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270.
7 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9, 14-15 (1965) (discussing the ramifications of this viewpoint).
71 See id. at 9-10 (seeming to concur in Professor Harry Kalven, Jr.'s assessment
that the opinion was in "substantial agreement" with Meiklejohn's theory). Justice
Brennan's subsequent opinions and speeches leave no doubt as to the influence of
the Meiklejohn interpretation of the First Amendment on his own understanding of
it. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S 555, 587 (1980) ("[T]he First
Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government." (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.");
Justice WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Address at the Dedication of the S.I. Newhouse Center
for Law and Justice in Newark, New Jersey (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV.
173, 176 (1979) ("[T]he First Amendment protects the structure of communications
necessary for the existence of our democracy.").
" Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaningof
the FirstAmendment", 1964 SuP. Cr. RE v. 191, 221.
80 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 8-19 (1991) (cataloguing the
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3. Constitutional Standards
The Supreme Court's distinction between content-neutral and
content-based speech restrictions is "the most pervasively employed
doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression."8 The central
concept of the rule against content-based speech restrictions is that
the "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."8 2 A speech
restriction that is content based is one that limits expression
3
because of its "communicative impact."1
However, to say that the government may never discriminate
against speech on the basis of its content is to overstate the case.
The rule, rather, is that in order to do so the government must be
prepared to show that the restriction is necessary to serve a

compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest-the so-called strict scrutiny standard. 4
Narrow
tailoring is a concept that eludes easy definition. When applied to

application of this principle to cases in the following areas: libel, national security,
public access to the press, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, taxation, free press/fair trial, and the right to gather news).
8"

Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY

L. REv. 189, 189 (1983).
s Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Texas v.Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
' See e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2467 (1994)
(explaining that the flaw in a previously invalidated statute was that it burdened
expression based on "communicative impact" and was a content-based preference
(discussing Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976))); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) (holding that the Flag Protection Act of 1989 "suppresses
expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact" and thus "cannot be
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech'" (citation
omitted)); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) (stating that regulations
which restrict speech because of its communicative impact are content-based and,
therefore, subject to strict scrutiny); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-

TIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-90 (2d ed. 1988) (summarizing government actions which
restrict speech because of its "specific message orviewpoint" as abridgements "aimed
at communicative impact" (emphasis omitted)); Stone, supra note 81, at 190
("Content-based restrictions ... limit communication because of the message
conveyed. Laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the publication of confidential
information, forbid the hiring of teachers who advocate the violent overthrow of
government, or outlaw the display of the swastika in certain neighborhoods illustrate
this type of restriction.").
4 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (defining strict scrutiny);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980) (same); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101
(same).
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content-based speech restrictions,8 5 narrow tailoring means that
there must be a very "tight fit" between the harm associated with
the speech and the means employed to prevent it."5 Means that
are either overinclusive or underinclusive-that proscribe either too
much or too little speech-can be fatal flaws. 8 7 A government

' The Court's scrutiny is less severe when the speech restriction is content
neutral. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (upholding a
regulation of concert noise in Central Park and stating that "a regulation of the time,
place or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so"); Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (rejecting CCNV's argument that because
other "less speech-restrictive alternatives" existed, the First Amendment required the
government to use them).
' Professor Tribe explains the concept this way:
The Court... requires an especially close nexus between ends and means.
A statute must be narrowly drawn so that a challenged act of government
is clearly an efficacious means to achieve permissible objectives of
government and is narrowly aimed at those permissible objectives so as not
unnecessarily to reach expressive conduct protected by the first amendment.
TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-8, at 833. The Court has occasionally stated that for a
speech regulation to be narrowly tailored, the government must be able to show that
there is no "less restrictive means" of achieving its stated interest. See infra note 177
(discussing
the "least restrictive means" formulation of the strict scrutiny standard).
8
7Justice Blackmun defined an overinclusive statute as "one that encompasses
more protected conduct than necessary to achieve its goal." Church of Lakumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2251 (1993) (Blackmun,J. concurring).
Another author states that "overinclusiveness" in the Court's free speech cases refers
to "unnecessarily restricted speech." The Supreme Cour, 1991 Term-LeadingCases, 106
HARV. L. REV. 163, 286 (1992). For examples of speech restrictions that the Court
has held invalid because of overinclusiveness, see, for example, Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987) (finding that a sales tax exemption
granted to certain categories of magazines was overinclusive and, therefore, not
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in fostering the growth of "fledgling"
magazines because it applied to all magazines that fell within the specified categories,
regardless of whether they were financially struggling or "lucrative and well-established"); infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991)).
"While surprising at first glance, the notion that a regulation of speech may be
impermissibly underinclusive is firmly grounded in basic First Amendment principles." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (1994). An underinclusive
speech restriction is one that "targets some conduct or actors for adverse treatment,
yet leaves untouched conduct or actors that are indistinguishable in terms of the law's
purpose." William E. Lee, The FirstAmendment Doctrine of Underbreadth,71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 637 (1993). The rationale commonly given for the underinclusiveness
doctrine is closely tied to the self-governance rationale discussed above. An
underinclusive speech restriction can be used by the government to suppress ideas
or information it finds objectionable, for example, by giving an advantage to one side
in a public debate. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) ("St.
Paul has no ... authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
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action that suppresses speech because of its content will fail the
narrow tailoring test whenever it can be shown that more speech
would avert the harm connected with the suppressed speech.8"
The presumption against content discrimination is a logical outgrowth of the marketplace of ideas rationale of the First Amendment. The assumption implicit in the rule that speech can only be
suppressed because of its content when one cannot count on "a
further exchange of ideas " 89 to avert the harm associated with the
speech is that truth will ultimately win the day in the marketplace

requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules."); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,785-86(1978) (stating that "where... legislature's suppression
of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly
offended" (footnote omitted)). Underinclusive restrictions on expression can also be
government tools for setting the terms of public discussion. See Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) (stating that government may
attempt to select the "permissible subjects for public debate" through such
restrictions or mischaracterizations). Underinclusive speech regulations thus tend to
frustrate the ideal of democratic self-governance. See supra part I.B.2 (discussing the
ideal of self-governance).
In his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927),Justice
Brandeis wrote: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence." Id. at 377 (Brandeis & Holmes,JJ., concurring).
The Court has subsequently adopted Brandeis's view, requiring that the government
justify content-based speech restrictions by showing that more speech would not
effectively prevent the harm associated with the restricted speech. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-20 (1989) (invalidating a Texas statute proscribing
desecration of the U.S. flag and stating that the constitutionally prescribed means of
"preserv[ing] the flag's special role" is not punishing those who mistreat it but
"persuad[ing] them that they are wrong"); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 398 (1984) (holding that a provision of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that
forbade noncommercial broadcasters from receiving funds under the Act to "engage
in editorializing" was not narrowly tailored to achieve the end of promoting balanced
and fair presentations on such broadcasters, as compared to requiring them to permit
more speech, including contrasting views); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982)
(explaining that a Kentucky statute requiring that a candidate for public office forfeit
his election victory if, during the campaign, he erroneously announces that if elected
he will serve at a reduced salary was not sustainable under the First Amendment
because correction and critique by the candidate's campaign opponent would serve
the state's interest without punishing expression of political ideas); Linmark Assocs.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (holding unconstitutional an
ordinance banning the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs enacted to discourage
"white flight" from racially integrated neighborhoods and suggesting that Willingboro
could achieve its objectives through "more speech," such as "Not for Sale" signs and
other publicity); see also TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-8, at 833-34 ("Whenever the harm
feared could be averted by a further exchange of ideas, governmental suppression is
conclusively deemed unnecessary." (emphasis omitted)).
8

9 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-8, at 833.
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of ideas.9" The presumption against content discrimination also
accords with the self-governance rationale of the First Amendment;
the ideal of the people making the system's most important
decisions, equipped with all pertinent information and having heard
the relevant arguments on all sides of an issue, would be thwarted
9
if the government could exclude ideas from public debate. '
C. Conflict Between the First and Sixth Amendments
The constitutional right of free speech-and specifically, the
right of free press-generally harmonizes with the constitutional
right to a fair trial. "Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the
quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with
benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole." 92 The
opportunity for the public to observe and review 9trial
proceedings
3
power.
of
abuse
government
on
check
serves as a
The Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that occasionally the free speech and fair trial rights can work at cross-purposes.94 Sometimes the maelstrom of public interest surrounding
a criminal trial 5 is so intense that it becomes exceedingly difficult
for the state to furnish ajury that measures up to the constitutional
standard of impartiality.96 As noted earlier, the Court has rejected

o Seesupra part I.B.1 (discussing the marketplace of ideasjustification for freedom
of speech).
91 See supra part I.B.2 (discussing the self-governance justification for freedom of
speech).
'2 Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). "[P]ublic access
to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public
respect for the judicial process." Id.; see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501,508 (1984) ("Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal
trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.").
Jeremy Bentham, in his diatribes against the use of secret trials in England, was
perhaps the first to point out the manner in which the rights to observe and report
on criminal proceedings can shore up the right to a fair trial. See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (London, Hunt & Clark 1827).
11 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) ("The knowledge that every criminal
trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse ofjudicial power.").
' See Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1307
(1974) (recognizing that reconciling these two rights is sometimes a difficult task);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) ("[F]ree speech and fair trials are two
of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to
choose between them.").
"5These cases normally involve either high-profile defendants or particularly
gruesome crimes. See Stephen, supra note 22, at 1066.
' This standard may, however, be satisfied even if jurors are aware of a
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resolving such conflicts between the First and Sixth Amendments by
simply assigning priority to one right over the other.17 Rather, the
Court has sought to resolve the conflict "without essentially
abrogating one right or the other.""8
II.

THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

This Part begins by considering three possible aims of
California's checkbook journalism statute to determine whether any
one of them constitutes a compelling governmental interest. It then
explains why the California statute banning checkbook journalism
is a content-based restriction on free expression. Finally, this Part
discusses whether this content-based restriction survives constitutional review and concludes that it does not because it is not
narrowly tailored to achieve its ends. This narrow-tailoring analysis
also outlines two alternate, narrowly-tailored means of accomplishing the statute's goals, which are later shown, in Part III, to conform
with the policy justifications behind free speech.
A. Purposes of the California Statute
The California legislature was relatively vague in spelling outjust
what the checkbook journalism statute was designed to accomplish.99 Legislators rarely explained which specific rights they had
in mind when debating the bill, but they often indicated a concern
for rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment."'0 The following
discussion explores three possible ways in which the statute may
further Sixth Amendment interests and addresses the degree to
which each is a compelling governmental interest.

defendant's criminal background and of the details of the crime with which she is
charged, see Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (rejecting the defendant's
challenge on grounds of actual bias under those circumstances), and even ifjurors
have a "preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of [the] accused." Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
"' See supra note 46 (discussing the Court's refusal to allow Sixth Amendment
rights categorically to outweigh First Amendment Rights).
8 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 612 (1976).
9 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) (declaring that the statute "is intended to
preserve the right of every accused person to a fair trial, the right of the people to
due process of law, and the integrity ofjudicial proceedings").
"oSee supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the legislature's Sixth
Amendment justifications).
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1. The Lying Witness Theory
One possible motivation behind the enactment of the California
statute may be a belief that the practice of checkbook journalism
promotes exaggerated or false testimony in court. 1 A witness
who takes money in exchange for information may have an incentive
to exaggerate, to embellish, or even to fabricate her story. Should
the individual later be called as a witness at a criminal trial, she may
feel compelled to stand by her earlier imperfect account for various
reasons, such as a desire to maintain credibility. This basis for the
statute unquestionably implicates a compelling governmental
interest-namely, seeing that false testimony is not proffered in
judicial proceedings. 0 2
2. The Incredulous Jury Theory
A second and closely related theory is that checkbookjournalism
results in the loss of credible evidence because juries will consider
the witness unreliable due to the financial interest the witness has
in the testimony. Under this theory, the fear is not that a witness
will exaggerate or lie under oath, but rather that the jury will infer
that she did exaggerate or lie and, hence, will discount the value of
her testimony.103 Whereas the harm to be averted under the lying
witness theory is the injection of false testimony into trials, the
harm under the incredulous jury theory is the rejection by skeptical
jurors of true and reliable testimony.
Whether a state's interest in discouraging juror incredulity of
witnesses is compelling is somewhat unclear. When viewed in the
most general terms, a state probably has a compelling interest in
101See The Ethics of Checkbook Journalism (NPR radio broadcast, July 29, 1994)

(airing California Assembly Speaker Brown's assertions that, when witnesses are paid,
they are "sometimes motivated to lie, or to... expand and embellish their stories").
On the day the bill was signed by the Governor of California, Brown stated, "This
kind of payment for testimony jeopardizes the very integrity of the criminal justice
system by encouraging false testimony." See GovernorSigns Bills, supra note 29, at 1.
" See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417 (1988) (stating that state officials
"ha[ve] a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the pollution of perjured
testimony").
10'This was the theory upon which Speaker Brown most often relied. See Bouncing
CheckbookJournalism,supra note 31, at I ("Payment... creates doubts in the minds
of jurors about the credibility of the witness."); Gillam, supra note 31, at A3 ("A
witness who tells the truth, but admits to being paid for his story, may lose credibility
in the eyes of thejury." (quoting Brown)); Brown DiscussesProposalto Outlaw Checkbook
Journalism,supra note 32 (arguing thatjurors should consider a witness's motive for
testifying in deciding how much weight to accord his testimony).
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discouraging juror incredulity of witnesses based on its desire to
ensure the accuracy of verdicts. Discouraging juries from unduly
discounting the testimony of certain witnesses could thus be viewed
as a way of promoting jury verdicts that are faithful to the evidence
in given cases, something that is certainly a compelling state
0 4
interest.
When examined more closely, however, a state's interest in
deterring jury incredulity of witnesses looks less compelling.1 0 5 At
bottom, the state's interest under this theory is in minimizing the
extent to which jurors dismiss otherwise reliable testimony because
of the taint brought about by witnesses' financial dealings with the
media. Essentially, this avowed purpose seeks to prevent the
injection into trial of witnesses who appear lacking in credibility. As
this Comment argues below, however, determining witness credibility has traditionally been one of the fundamental roles of the
0
jury.1
6
Hence, the proposition that a state has a compelling
interest in wresting control of witness credibility issues from the
jury is at least questionable.
3. The Prejudicial Publicity Theory
A final theory is that the practice of checkbookjournalism might
induce a witness to make public information-true or fabricatedthat, but for the financial incentive, she would otherwise share only
with authorities and, eventually, possibly with the jury. The fear
behind this theory is that the added incentive to publicize such
information could result in extensive prejudicial publicity, perhaps
14 This undertaking could, thus, be characterized as a means of advancing the

truth-finding function of the courts, see United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33
(1988) (indicating that this is the "central purpose of a criminal trial"), as a way of
ensuring that verdicts are based only on evidence presented in court, see Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1907) ("The theory of our system is that the conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only be evidence and argument in open court,
and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print."), or as a
way of enhancing public confidence in the reliability of verdicts. See In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (emphasizing the strong societal interest in the reliability
of verdicts).
" The core of this Comment's critique goes to the means by which the statute
pursues its stated ends, but not the ends themselves. Thus, this discussion only
briefly raises arguments that suggest that the statute's stated ends are less than
compelling. The arguments are in many respects similar to the discussion of the
jury's role with regard to determining witness credibility. See infra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text.
106 See id.
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tainting the jury pool to the extent that it would become impossible
for the state to supply the impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Unlike the lying witness and incredulous jury
theories, the prejudicial publicity theory is concerned with checkbook journalism's potential effects outside the courtroom.
A state's interest in ensuring that a defendant's trial is not
marked by pervasive public prejudice against her is clearly
compelling. Extensive public prejudice may lead either to the
impossibility of impaneling an impartial jury or to a trial by a partial jury.1 17 If no impartial jury can be impaneled, the Sixth
Amendment entitles the defendant to a dismissal of the charges
against him.'
Trial by a prejudiced jury also violates the Sixth
Amendment and, thus, entitles the defendant to a reversal of her
conviction.' 9 The Supreme Court has stated that state governments have not only an interest in controlling prejudicial publicity
against a defendant, but also a duty to do so."0 Thus, even
I07 See infra note 110 (providing examples of the effects of partial juries).
"See United States v. Abbott Lab., 505 F.2d 565, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1974)
(suggesting that, when an impartialjury cannot be found, dismissal is the appropriate
remedy); United States v. Cotton, No. 68-113, slip op. (E.D. Wis. June 11, 1969)
(dismissing charges against the defendant because no impartial jury could be impaneled); United States v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885, 933 (D.Vt. 1961) (same), rev'd on
other grounds, 306 F.2d 596 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963); see also Skelly
Wright, FairTrial-FreePress, 38 F.R.D. 435, 435 (1965). Wright notes,
It is my belief that full recognition of the news media's rights under the
First Amendment would prevent a fair trial before an impartial jury as
required by the Sixth Amendment in only a precious few cases, and that the
dismissal of those cases as non-triable would be small price to pay for the
great benefits we all receive ... from the disclosures made in the press ....
Id.
" See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,363 (1966) (reversing a defendant's
conviction because "inherently prejudicial publicity" had saturated the community in
which he was tried); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S 532, 551-52 (1965) (reversing the
conviction of a defendant because the live telecasting of his trial rendered the jury
partial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (holding that the broadcast of
a defendant's confession in the days preceding his trial precluded the possibility of
any fair proceedings); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (reversing a conviction
and stating, "[w]ith his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be
tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion").
It is important to remember, however, that "pre-trial publicity-even pervasive,
adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial." Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). Prejudicial publicity leads to an unfair trial only
when a defendant can satisfy the Court's tests for actual or presumed juror bias. See
supra part L.A (discussing the difficulty of proving actual or presumed bias).
11' See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 553 (holding that the government has a
duty to protect defendants against the effects of prejudicial publicity); Sheppard, 384
U.S. at 335 (reversing defendant's conviction "because of the trial judge's failure to
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though the incredulous jury theory, by virtue of its subversion of
normal jury functions, may not constitute a compelling state
interest, the prejudicial publicity theory makes a stronger showing
of a compelling governmental interest underlying the statute. As
the following sections will demonstrate, however, the statute cannot
survive constitutional scrutiny on the strength of the ends it seeks
to pursue. Rather, because the statute is content based, it must be
narrowly tailored to further those ends.
B. The Content-Based Component of the Checkbook
Journalism Statute
The principle that the government may not "restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its conn2
is a cornerstone of First Amendment jurisprudence.
tent"'
The California statute clearly implicates this proscription against
content-based restrictions on expression. By its terms, it regulates
only speech pertaining to "information obtained as a result of
witnessing the event or occurrence.""'
Thus, it regulates only
speech with a certain subject matter or content. Witnesses face no
restrictions on their communications relating to any other topic on
which they might choose to speak.
The statute's content-based regulation of this type of speech
does not, however, rise to the level of a complete ban. Rather, it
merely forbids witnesses from receiving money for certain types of
speech." 4 The Supreme Court has held, however, that contentbased financial disincentives are still suspect under the First
Amendment because they discriminate against certain types of
speech on the basis of its content or communicative impact, even
though they do not ban the speech completely. The Court has held
that, because of their content discrimination, these statutes must
meet the strict scrutiny standard. For example, in Minneapolis Star
v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue," 5 the Court subjected to
strict scrutiny, and struck down, a state tax on the cost of paper and

protect [the defendant] sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial
publicity that attended his prosecution").
...
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
n' See suprapart I.B.3 (discussing the constitutional standards for restrictions on
speech).
u- CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(b).
n4 See id.

I'5 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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ink used in publications on the theory that the tax was directed at
the communicative impact of speech." 6
Similarly, the Court
refused to uphold an Arkansas statute that taxed general interest
magazines, but exempted newspapers and religious, professional,
trade, and sports journals, because the tax had the effect of favoring
the dissemination of particular ideas over others. 117 The Court
reaffirmed this doctrine in 1991, when it examined New York State's
"Son of Sam" law. 1 That law prevented criminals from profiting
through their crimes by requiring that any income generated by an
accused or convicted criminal's account of her crimes be deposited
119
in an account for the benefit of her victims and their families.
Justice O'Connor, for the Court, declared that "The Son of Sam law
is ... a content-based statute. It singles out income derived from
expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income,
and it is directed only at works with a specified content." 120 After
concluding that the interest relied on by the state was not compelling, and that, in any event, the restriction on expression was not
narrowly drawn to achieve the stated interest, the Court struck
21
down the statute.
In the same case, the Court established another important
proposition: the validity of a content-based financial disincentive to
speak does not depend upon which party is subject to the restric6

See id. at 592-93.
"'See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,234 (1987); see also
"

Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991) (holding that differential taxation
of speakers implicates the First Amendment when the differential treatment is
directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas); Grosjean v.

American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-51 (1936) (invalidating a Louisiana statutory
tax on select newspapers, all of which happened to be outspoken critics of the
governor).
" See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991).
1 9 See id. at 503.
"o Id. at 509. The California statute suffers from this same constitutional defect
in that it restricts the dissemination of speech with a particular content.
Regulations on speech, however, can be found to be content based even if they
do not explicitly single out speech with a particular subject matter. Just last term, the

Supreme Court subjected a statute to strict scrutiny because it placed a burden on
"expressive activity" by prohibiting governmental employees from receiving compensation for speeches or writings. In striking down this ban on remuneration for
speech, the Court declared, "although [the statute] neither prohibits any speech nor
discriminates among speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their messages,
its prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant burden on

expressive activity." United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct.
1003, 1014 (1995).
11 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 512.
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tion. 22 Thus, financial disincentives to expression are impermissible regardless of whether they are placed on private individuals
seeking to engage in the speech or on media organizations seeking
to disseminate it.
California's law banning checkbook journalism is in many
respects similar to New York's Son of Sam law, which the Court
unanimously held discriminated on the basis of content and thus
triggered strict scrutiny review because it imposed a financial
burden "only on speech of a particular content."1 2- Under the
Son of Sam law, accused or convicted persons were free to sell and
keep the profits from any works they produced except those that
described their crimes. Similarly, under the California statute,
witnesses are free to profit from any communication except those
relating to their knowledge of a criminal investigation or trial.
Singling out works of a particular content for differential financial
treatment is a form of content discrimination. Moreover, the
California statute goes beyond merely forbidding profit for certain
types of speech; it also prescribes fines and jail time for certain
kinds of expression. 124 By placing not only financial disincentives
but also punitive deterrents on the communication of only certain
information, California's law against checkbook journalism, like New
York's Son of Sam law, discriminates on the basis of content and
thus must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard. Accordingly, the statute can survive constitutional muster only if it is
125
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
California has grounded its asserted interest in the checkbook
journalism statute on an interest in preserving fair trial rights. 26
The statute may serve fair trial interests in three possible ways:
deterring witness dishonesty, discouraging jury incredulity of
witnesses, and forestalling extensive prejudicial publicity. 127 In
addition, despite complexities undermining the validity of the state's
interest in deterring incredulous juries, the state still could argue

12 See id. at 503 ("[T]he governmental power to impose content-based financial
disincentives on speech does not vary with the identity of the speaker.").
12
3 Id. at 509.
124See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(e) (providing that the sale of information relating
to criminal investigations or prosecutions is punishable by fines of up to three times
the amount the witness received for the story and up to six months in jail).
125See, e.g., supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text
126See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for the
California statute).
127See supra part II.A (discussing how the statute relates to the furtherance of
these interests).
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that its interest in preserving fair trial rights is compelling under the
theories of excluding false testimony and minimizing prejudicial
publicity, thereby meeting the first prong of strict scrutiny analysis. ' Accordingly, the next section proceeds to the second prong
of the strict scrutiny analysis, examining whether the statute is
narrowly tailored to protect compelling state interests.
C. The Means to Securing a FairTrial Under the
Narrow Tailoring Test
The lying witness theory addresses the possible introduction of
unreliable evidence-evidence tainted by witnesses' financially
induced embellishments-at trial. The incredulous jury theory
addresses the converse problem: the possible exclusion of reliable
evidence, which a jury might discount on the suspicion that
witnesses who have been paid by the press are untrustworthy. Both
of these fair trial interests address the accuracy of the evidentiary
process. Because of the similarity of these two theories in seeking
to ensure the integrity of the evidentiary process, the degree to
which the statute is narrowly tailored to ameliorate these perceived
threats will be examined together. The prejudicial publicity theory,
by contrast, is directed to aspects of the fair trial right extrinsic to
fact-finding processes. Accordingly, its fate under the narrow
tailoring prong of the First Amendment jurisprudence will be
discussed separately.
1. Under the Lying Witness and Incredulous Jury Theories
To be found a constitutionally valid content-based restriction on
speech, the California statute must be narrowly tailored to the
compelling state interest of preserving fair-trial rights. Two possible
means by which it might serve that interest are by discouraging
witness dishonesty or by mitigating jury incredulity, thereby
preventing juries from relying on false or exaggerated testimony or
discrediting otherwise reliable statements. To survive the strict
scrutiny required of content-based restrictions, the statute must
demonstrate a "tight fit" between the ends pursued and the means
used to pursue them. Means that are either overinclusive or
underinclusive in the speech they restrict fall afoul of the First
Amendment."' Similarly, when allowing more speech would avert
12

See supra part II.A.

'

See supranotes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases
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the harms associated with the speech sought to be restricted, then
the speech restriction will likely fail the narrow tailoring test 30 As
the following analysis demonstrates, the California statute is rife
with problems under these narrow tailoring requirements. First, the
harm sought to be redressed, namely the tainting of the evidentiary
process, can be averted with further speech. Second, the statute
lacks a "tight fit" with the avowed goal of protecting the integrity of
the fact-finding process, because the statute itself subverts fundamental elements of that process. Finally, the statute fails the narrow
tailoring test because it is underinclusive.
a. Less Restrictive Means in Similar Situations

One way of showing that a governmental action restricting
expression is not narrowly tailored to achieve its ends is to demonstrate that those ends could be achieved in other ways that do not
restrict freedom of speech.' 3 ' According to Professor Laurence
Tribe, "whenever the harm feared could be averted by a further
exchange of ideas, governmental suppression is conclusively deemed
32
unnecessary."1
To see how the harms of witness dishonesty and jury incredulity
can be averted by a further exchange of ideas in a way that does not
restrict freedom of expression, it is helpful to compare media-paid
witnesses to other categories of trial participants who are similarly
situated. 13 3 Perhaps the clearest analogy is to expert witnesses,
who are routinely paid for their testimonies."3 4 The same fears
motivating the ban on checkbook journalism-that it induces
witnesses to lie or exaggerate, or that it leads the jury to assume
that an otherwise credible witness is lying or exaggerating-appear
applying strict scrutiny).
1o Seesupra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing the "narrowly tailored"
requirement).
131TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-8, at 833-34 (discussing the basis for invalidating a
statute).
132 Id. (emphasis omitted).
155 Editorial pages have noted the comparison between media-paid witnesses and
other trial participants whose credibilities are in question. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Should Witnesses Be Allowed to Sell Their Stories Before the Trial?,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1994, at B7 (concluding that witnesses should be able to sell their stories); Muzzling
Witnesses No Guaranteeof FairTrial, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1994, at 1OA (disagreeing
with the rationale of the California statute).
13 See FED. R. EVID. 706(b) (entitling court-appointed experts to reasonable
compensation); 31A AM.JUR. 2D Witnesses § 19-25 (1992) (contemplating that expert
witnesses may be paid for their testimony).
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to be equally present when a paid expert testifies on behalf of one
13 5
party
Yet, rather than ban the practice of paying expert witnesses, the
system has devised a simple and effective solution that does not
restrict freedom of expression: cross-examination. Cross-examination has been an essential instrument in fulfilling the truthfinding function of our adversary system for over two hundred
years.136 In criminal cases, the defendant's right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses is grounded in the Bill of Rights. 3 The critical
purpose of cross-examination is to elicit "the facts which diminish
the personal trustworthiness of the witness."13
An attorney may cross-examine a witness to elicit any bias the
witness has in favor of a party, any prejudice the witness harbors
against a party, and any personal interest the witness has in the
outcome of the trial proceeding."'
This kind of information
furthers the truth-finding process by helping the fact finder decide
how much credibility to attach to a witness. "Cross-examination,"
the Supreme Court has stated, "is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
140
tested."
In addition to substantive challenges to their testimony, experts
may be cross-examined about any financial interests implicated in
the instant case, employment relationships with a party or real party
in interest in the suit, or prior testimony for the same party or
attorney in other litigation.14 ' Anticipation of a persistent cross15 See generally Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1168

(listingseveral grounds on which expert witnesses maybe impeached and stating that
financial bias is one that has "special bite");JeffreyJ. Parker, Note, ContingentExpert
Witness Fees: Access and Legitimacy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1363, 1385-1388 (1991)
(discussing several forms of financial bias that are likely to influence expert witnesses).
1s6 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 30 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
1 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. This provision, the Confrontation Clause, has been
interpreted as guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses
against them to test the credibility of their testimony. See generally Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) ("We hold today that the Sixth Amendment's right of an
accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
'38 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1368, at 37
(Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974). The other primary purpose of cross-examination is
to draw out any "remaining and qualifying circumstances" of the witness's testimony.
5 Id. at 36.
139 See, e.g., ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 109-27 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing methods of attacking
witness credibility).
140 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
141See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 139, at 22 (summarizing proper
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examiner may motivate an expert not to lie or exaggerate while
testifying on direct examination. The appearance of dishonesty or

unreliability may irreparably damage her reputation, severely
curtailing the expert's ability to make a living.'42 Deterrents such as
perjury prosecutions 143 and libel suits 144 provide further checks on

dishonest testimony.
With these safeguards in place the jury can observe "the greatest

legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" 145 in action
and adjudge whether the expert witness is credible or whether

financial incentives to proffer particular testimony have rendered
the testimony unreliable. In the same manner, cross-examination
of a media-paid fact witness can help the jury ascertain whether the
witness's story remains credible despite the remuneration, or
whether it appears to be fabricated or exaggerated to exploit media

cross-examination questions regarding an expert's financial interests in her
testimony); Michael H. Graham, Impeachment of Expert Witness-FinancialInterest, 21
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 73 (1980) (discussing expert-witness bias caused by
financial interests in the trial outcome).
142 Arguably, the fact that expert witnesses depend on their credibility for their
livelihood makes cross-examination a more effective deterrent against lying expert
witnesses than against lying fact witnesses. This argument, however, assumes that fact
witnesses are indifferent to thejudgments of those around them. Fact witnesses, like
anyone else, have an interest in preserving their reputations, and thus would fear
being exposed as unreliable or dishonest before their communities, employers,
colleagues, families, and friends, even if their livelihood is not directly linked to the
credibility of their testimony. There is little reason to assume that the average fact
witness's incentive to maintain her personal reputation is significantly weaker than the
average expert witness's incentive to maintain her professional reputation.
Indeed, expert witnesses may have more actual or perceived reasons to stand by
a false or exaggerated testimony than media-paid witnesses. Precisely because her
livelihood depends on making certain statements, the expert cannot retreat from her
prior testimony under the pressure of cross-examination without great risk to her
future career as an expert witness. Media-paid fact witnesses, however, are likely to
be one-time witnesses to crimes who may have already exploited their stories to their
fullest profit-making potential. Media-paid witnesses would be more likely to render
truthful testimony in court when faced with the pressures of taking an oath and
enduring cross-examination, having no further interest in maintaining exaggerated
testimony. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 3, at A2 (reporting that witnesses in the
high-profile MichaelJackson investigation rendered testimony in depositions that was
less sensational than statements they made to the media). Thus, the lying witness and
incredulous jury problems are no more severe with media-paid witnesses than with
expert witnesses, and in some instances may be less severe.
"I See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (providing that perjury in federal court
is punishable by fine and imprisonment of up to five years).
...
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defining standards
for libel cause of action).
1455 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 1367.
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sensationalism. Factors such as the credibility of the story itself, the
amount of corroborating testimony or evidence, the witness's
demeanor, and the degree to which the story has remained
consistent throughout dealings with authorities and with the media
can help the jury to determine the ultimate reliability of the
testimony.
Another useful analogue to the checkbook journalism witness is
the criminal defendant who plea-bargains with the government,
offering testimony to aid the prosecution at another trial in
exchange for clemency. The plea-bargaining defendant raises
concerns similar to those raised by the paid expert and the witness
who profits from checkbook journalism. 4 6 All three have incentives to make particular statements, raising doubts about their
credibility. For example, a defendant who was part of a conspiracy
and who accepted a reduced charge or a grant of immunity in
exchange for testimony inculpating coconspirators has a clear
incentive to give her benefactors-the prosecution-evidence
sufficient to secure convictions against the other conspirators. In
addition to the risk of the witness lying or exaggerating to give the
prosecution what it wants, there is also a rational fear that the jury
will not believe the testimony of the plea-bargainer because of her
interest in the case, as with paid experts or witnesses who have
taken money from tabloids. Indeed, the lying witness and incredulous jury concerns are even stronger with respect to the pleabargaining witness than with expert witnesses or fact witnesses who
have taken money from the media, because the plea-bargaining
witness's interest in standing by particular statements goes beyond
monetary gain and implicates her very liberty.
Yet, rather than ban the practice of plea-bargaining because it
arguably taints the evidentiary process, the Supreme Court has
wholeheartedly endorsed it. 4 ' Courts commonly allow the testimony of a plea-bargaining witness to be used against other defendants. 48 Courts, however, have not been blind to the aforemen46

' See Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea

Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 802, 826 (1987) (arguing that "[plica bargains
conditioned upon indictment, conviction, or prosecutorial satisfaction with testimony"
encourage
perjury and other unreliable testimony).
147 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (treating pleabargaining as an essential means of securing testimony).
..See, e.g., Fallen v. United States, 220 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding
testimony of a conspirator admissible against coconspirator); State v. Carey, 206
S.E.2d 213,219 (N.C. 1974) (noting that declaration of one conspirator is competent
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tioned dangers of the practice. In fact, most have been acutely
aware of these dangers but have regulated them with the tool of
cross-examination. A witness who has plea-bargained may be
impeached on cross-examination in numerous ways. The defendant
against whom the plea-bargaining witness is testifying has the right
to ask the witness whether he has been granted immunity or other
special treatment, 4 9 or has bought his peace from the prosecution, 150 and to argue that his testimony is unreliable because of
the likelihood that it is fashioned to curry favor with the prosecudon.

15 1

Cross-examination of this scope thus minimizes the risk that
juries will rely on evidence tainted by the incentives to lie or
exaggerate inherent in plea-bargaining. Moreover, cross-examination allows the jury to decide the degree of skepticism with which
it receives the testimony. Instead of restrictions which rashly
discount the testimony of every plea-bargaining witness because of
potential incentives to lie, cross-examination allows the jury to
assess witnesses' demeanor on the stand'5 2 and consistency in the
face of intense questioning. They jury can then decide how much
credibility to attribute to each witness. This same process would

evidence against other conspirators); David A. Jones, Negotiation, Ratification, and
Rescission of the Guilty PleaAgreement: A ContractualAnalysis and Typology, 17 DUQ. L.
REV. 591, 605-06 (1978-1979); James M. Smith & William P. Dale, Note, The
Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
771, 772-73 (1973).
" See, e.g., Spaeth v. United States, 232 F.2d 776, 779 (6th Cir. 1956) (affirming
that it is "entirely proper on cross-examination of a witness 'to show a belief or even
only a hope on his part that he will secure immunity or a lighter sentence, or any
other favorable treatment, in return for his testimony'"); People v. Bote, 33 N.E.2d
449, 451-52 (Ill. 1941) (holding that defendant must be allowed to cross-examine
codefendant on conditions of the plea bargain that the prosecutor used to convince
codefendant to testify).

"5See, e.g., State v. Ponthier, 346 P.2d 974, 980 (Mont. 1959) (upholding the right
of cross-examination to elicit whether the witness has received favors from the
prosecution).
151 See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 652 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ark. 1983) (holding that
defense counsel was entitled to ask on cross-examination "What kind of deal are you
getting for yourself?" and finding reversible error in trial court's denial of opportunity
to elicit answer to that question for the jury's consideration); People v. Buchanan, 393
N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (App. Div. 1977) (recognizing ways in which testimony of indicted

witness could be unreliable).
5' The Court has explicitly stated that it is proper for thejury to take into account
the appearance, manner, and demeanor of the witness while testifying. See California

v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (acknowledging admissibility of out-of-court
statements made by witness when declarant had been subject to full and effective

cross-examination).
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effectively redress the lying witness and incredulous jury problems
raised by checkbook journalism. Upon cross-examination, the jury
could decide whether the totality of factors, including the sale of
her story to the press, suggests that the witness and her testimony
are reliable.
The problem of checkbook journalism witnesses should not be
treated any differently from its closest analogues in our adversary
system. If cross-examination sufficiently safeguards against the
dangers inherent in the induced testimony of paid experts or pleabargainers, then it should sufficiently safeguard against the identical
dangers inherent in the practice of checkbook journalism. Where
experts receive money and plea-bargainers receive clemency in
return for their testimony, the state has not regulated the source of
the inducement. Neither has the state forbidden payment to expert
witnesses or restricted plea bargaining as a means of eliciting
testimony against other defendants. Rather, the state has found
cross-examination to be an effective means of discrediting unreliable
testimony or dispelling the appearance of impropriety surrounding
otherwise reliable induced testimony. Cross-examination could cure
the fair-trial concern for evidentiary integrity in the checkbook
journalism context with equal effectiveness. Thus, the statute is
poorly tailored to remedy any potential lying witness or incredulous
jury problems, unnecessarily fettering the dissemination of speech
instead of pursuing less restrictive alternatives. 5 ' This lack of
narrow tailoring makes the statute suspect as a form of contentbased discrimination against the message imparted by checkbook
journalism witnesses, rather than a narrowly tailored means of
pursuing a legitimate state interest in the integrity of the factfinding process.

b. Inconsistency with Underlying Goals
The California statute suffers from another defect in the means
by which it pursues its goal of ensuring fair trials: the means
compromise not only First Amendment interests, but also Sixth
Amendment interests. It is fundamental to our system of justice
that the role of the jury in criminal and civil trials is to decide issues
of fact.'
The Supreme Court has underscored its importance,
155See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that a governmental

action that restricts expression unnecessarily cannot survive constitutional review
under the strict standard).
" See, e.g., Bailey v. Central Vermont R.R., 319 U.S. 350, 353 (1943) (explaining
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noting that the role of the jury as a fact-finding body "is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."' 5 5 In criminal
cases, trial by jury serves as a check on government oppression by
assuring that the relevant community participates in the determination of guilt or innocence.'5 6 It also provides a "fair and equita1 57
ble" means of resolving issues of fact.
The credibility of a witness is a quintessential issue of fact. For
this reason courts have almost universally held that credibility is the
sole province of the jury, 158 and have disallowed testimony by
experts as to whether the jury should believe a witness or not. 159
By enacting legislation that declares that certain conduct inexorably
erodes the credibility of a witness, the state of California has
substituted its own blanket judgment regarding what determines
witness credibility for the individualized judgments of juries. In so
doing, the state has impinged on a fundamental aspect of the Sixth
Amendment-the right to a trial by ajury of one's peers. Paradoxically, then, the state has abrogated Sixth Amendment rights while
purporting to further those same guarantees. 60 A statute that

that the "juryis the tribunal under our legal system to decide" factual questions about
which reasonable persons might differ); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (stating that the Bill of Rights incorporates the central role of
the jury in determining issues of fact).
155 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S 500, 501 (1959); see also Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 445 (1830) ("The trial by jury is justly dear to the American
people. It has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every
encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.").
1"6 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) ("[T]he essential feature of a
jury ... lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation
and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Providing the accused
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge.").
157 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973).
"sSee State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982) (noting that once a
witness is deemed competent, expert opinions concerning the witness's reliability in
distinguishing truth from fantasy are generally inadmissible because such opinions
invade the jury's province to make credibility determinations).
9
's See United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding the
exclusion of expert testimony regarding a witness's credibility because such testimony
would invade the province of the jury); United States v. Wertis, 505 F.2d 683, 685
(5th Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)
("Credibility... is for the jury-the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.").
16
o See supra part II.A (noting that the California legislature invoked Sixth
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compromises an important aspect of the very interest it claims to
further can hardly be said to be narrowly tailored to furthering that
interest.
c. Underinclusiveness
There is a final sense in which the statute is not narrowly
tailored to counteract the dangers of witness dishonesty and jury
incredulity. Even if cross-examination were not always a sufficient
safeguard against these risks, necessitating some restriction on
speech to protect fair trial interests in mitigating these risks, the
statute's underinclusiveness renders it ill suited to redress the
potential harms wrought by dishonest witnesses and incredulous
juries.
There are numerous reasons why a witness in a particular
criminal proceeding might give fabricated or exaggerated testimony.
For example, a witness might be prejudiced against the defendant,
biased in favor of the defendant, or personally interested in the
outcome of the case. 6 A state determined to rectify this problem
would presumably take some action to discourage witness dishonesty, whatever the witness's motivation, through a measure that
would apply to any witness with an incentive to lie or exaggerate.
California, however, has not done so. The statute has singled
out one small class of witnesses whose potential incentive to utter
untruthful testimony derives from speaking on a particular subject
matter, and has attempted to discourage them from exercising this
constitutional right by placing a content-based burden on the
dissemination of this speech. The statute has done nothing to
discourage false testimony among those witnesses whose incentives
stem from anything other than checkbook journalism. The gross
underinclusiveness of the statute makes it poorly tailored to further
California's interest in preventing false testimony in its courts.
Indeed, the statute's underinclusiveness suggests that the motivation
for enacting it was less a concern with false testimony than an
aversion to the content of the speech often expressed through
checkbook journalism. 162 This governmental attempt to disfavor

Amendment rights as the purpose underlying the checkbook journalism statute and
analyzing ways in which the statute may further Sixth Amendment concerns).
...
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing sources of witness bias).
162 A finding that a legislature was motivated by desire to suppress speech of a
particular content can be grounds for invalidating the legislation. See Unitcd States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (striking down the Flag Protection Act of 1989
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certain speech it finds distasteful goes to the heart of what the First
1 6
Amendment forbids. 3
The statute is as underinclusive in its response to harms
associated with incredulous juries as it is in redressing problems
with dishonest witnesses. There are as many reasons a jury might
discount the value of a witness's testimony as there are reasons a
witness might not be completely forthright. The statute is underinclusive because it targets only one class of witnesses of whom
juries might be incredulous."M It is thus not narrowly tailored to
serve the state's interest and, again, leads one to conclude that the
state's ostensible concern with incredulous juries is really a screen
for disgust with the speech involved in checkbook journalism.
2. Under the Prejudicial Publicity Theory
In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant can rarely prove that juror prejudice rose
to a level that implicated her Sixth Amendment rights. 165 The
fair-trial rights embodied in that provision do not, after all, require
that ajury be entirely unfamiliar with a case, but rather require only
that the jury be able to set aside any preconceived impressions and
"render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." 166
The exceptional character of the case that will support an argument
for juror prejudice signals another way in which the statute is not
narrowly tailored.

on the grounds that the statute, even if content neutral on its face, was motivated by
content-based distaste for speech communicating certain ideas).
163Seesupra part I.B.3 (noting the First Amendment's concern with preventing the
government from suppressing the expression of certain ideas). The risk of
governmental use of underinclusive speech restrictions to suppress ideas or
information it considers objectionable is one of the central reasons the Court has
given for making underinclusiveness a fatal defect in regulations of expression. See
supra note 87 (explaining the First Amendment problem of underinclusive speech
restrictions).
16 As noted earlier, the state's claim that it has any legitimate interest in
preventing juror incredulity is suspect, given the jury's fundamental constitutional
role in weighing the credibility of the evidence. See supra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text.
163See supra part L.A (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting the
scope of Sixth Amendment fair-trial guarantees).
166 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,723 (1961); see also suprapart I.A (describing Sixth
Amendmentjurisprudence and noting its tendency to tolerate a significant degree of
juror exposure to the facts of the case before finding a juror too biased for Sixth
Amendment purposes).
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The statute by its terms applies to any person who "knows or
reasonably should know" that she may be called as a witness in any
criminal prosecution.1t 7 It applies to every potential witness in
every potential criminal case in the state of California. However,
only a small fraction of the total number of criminal prosecutions
in California will be attended by circumstances that justify concern
about prejudicial publicity and tainted jury pools. For example,
there is no reason to assume that the testimony of every witness
who contracts with the media to sell information will be adverse to
the defendant. 6 s The stories of some media-paid witnesses will
tend to exculpate rather than inculpate the defendant and will tend
to allay rather than inflame public prejudice. The testimonies of
other media-paid witnesses may be adverse to the defendant but
unlikely to arouse the amount or kind of publicity that would
jeopardize fair-trial rights. For instance, the media might pay an
otherwise reluctant witness a modest amount to come forward with
a story that draws short-lived or local public attention, but that
would have faded into insignificance by the time of trial and would
never have been publicized in the geographic area where the trial
is to be held. In those cases, the checkbook journalism statute
would have removed speech from the public debate on the basis of
its content, without furthering its avowed Sixth Amendment
concerns in any rational way. These examples demonstrate how the
statute is not narrowly tailored to prevent prejudicial publicity. It
is overinclusive because it burdens the free speech rights of
witnesses in cases where there is little or no threat of extensive
prejudicial publicity.
167 CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 132.5(b).

" Al Cowlings, O.J. Simpson's lifelong friend and companion during the televised
low-speed freeway chase, has reportedly been offered "up to $1 million for his story,"
but has so far declined all offers. Weinstein, supra note 3, at Al. Had he accepted
one, however, his story would have been favorable to the defendant, as Cowlings has
staunchly maintained his belief in Simpson's innocence. See Robert P. Laurence, Our
Exclusive! O.J.! TV Tabloids!, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Feb. 20, 1995, at Dl.

Rumors have circulated that another witness in the Simpson trial, Rosa Lopez,
was paid $5000 by a tabloid for her story, although these speculations remain
unsubstantiated. See Rosa Lopez Scheduled to Resume Cross-ExaminationToday (NPR
radio broadcast, Mar. 3, 1995). Lopez's testimony places Simpson's car at his
residence during the time the murders were allegedly committed and thus serves as
an alibi for the defendant. See id. These are two recent examples of potential mediapaid witnesses whose unrestricted contact with the press would not prejudice the
defendant's right to receive a fair trial.
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Instituting such an overinclusive statute may also preclude
speech which might contribute to public debate about the criminal
process and its treatment of criminal defendants and does not
unduly prejudicejurors. In such instances, the statute's overbreadth
would compromise the First Amendment's self-governance 169 and
marketplace of ideas rationales,7a' while failing to further Sixth
Amendment fair-trial concerns.
Alternative means of curing prejudicial publicity problems are
available. First, courts have at their disposal a number of mechanisms designed to prevent prejudice to a defendant, none of which
restrict free speech. Courts can change the venue of a trial or
postpone it. Courts may also sequester the jurors and give careful
jury instructions on which factors the jury may consider in reaching
its verdict.'' These mechanisms will often suffice to ensure that
a trial will meet the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by an
impartial jury.'72 In the numerous cases where these protective
measures could ensure an impartial jury, no speech would suffer a
content-based disincentive to its dissemination, and the public
debate would proceed unfettered.
In the cases in which prejudicial publicity would be particularly
intense, ajudge still has the option of imposing an order forbidding
an anticipated witness from accepting payment for her testimony.
The judge could determine, either sua sponte or on a party's
motion, that the case poses a particularly severe risk of prejudicial
publicity, which warrants a restriction on accepting compensation
for speech related to the trial.
Although such judicial orders would still constitute a contentbased restriction on free speech and would be subject to strict
scrutiny,7 3 these case-by-case orders would be more narrowly
tailored to mitigating the harm of prejudicial publicity and, thus,
would fare better under constitutional scrutiny than the California
169See supra part I.B.2 (explaining the self-governance rationale underlying the
First Amendment).
171See supra part I.B.1 (explaining the marketplace of ideas rationale).
171See supra notes 22-28 (describing various mechanisms of ensuring fair trials).
17 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (holding that to meet Sixth
Amendment standards of impartiality, ajuror need not have been wholly insulated
from the case, as long as the juror is impartial enough to decide the case on the
evidence at trial).
17" See supra part II.B (explaining that a financial disincentive directed at the
dissemination of speech with a particular subject matter or content, such as that
embodied in the California statute, is a content-based restriction that may only survive
strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest).
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statute. Whereas the statute automatically presumes a risk of
prejudicial publicity in any criminal trial, judicial orders would be
predicated on a specific finding that speech-neutral mechanisms are
insufficient to preserve an impartial jury. These restrictions would
thus be the exception rather than the rule and would consequently
suppress speech only when absolutely necessary, avoiding the
overinclusiveness problem that plagues the current statute. Under
this system, only those witnesses who would actually jeopardize the
defendant's right to a fair trial would be forbidden from selling
information, whereas all other witnesses would be free to disseminate their speech on whatever terms they chose. Furthermore,
although the statute's restrictions apply to all speech related to the
trial and last throughout the duration of the trial, a case-specific
approach would allow restrictions only on the parts of a witness's
story that a judge would deem likely to be prejudicial and only
during the time when the speech would be likely to have prejudicial
effects. A judicially managed, case-specific approach to this
problem would thus infringe upon free speech rights only to the
extent necessary to serve the compelling government interest of
preserving fair-trial rights. A reviewing court would thus be more
likely to find this case-specific restriction to be narrowly tailored in
satisfaction of First Amendment standards.
This case-specific approach, despite curing the major constitutional problems with California's statutory approach, would
nonetheless present several problems of its own. First, the judge
may not always be able to restrict prejudicial speech to the narrowest degree necessary. The case-by-case approach would require
some speculation, because a judge could never know with certainty
which individuals would actually testify at trial and what degree of
public prejudice their story, if sold to the press, would generate.
Judicial orders could, therefore, also be overinclusive by restricting
payment for testimony from individuals who would not be called as
witnesses or from actual witnesses whose statements would not
prejudice the trial publicity against the defendant to an impermissible degree. Althoughjudicial orders may, at times, be overreaching,
they would, nonetheless, be more tailored in scope than statutes
that forbid all witnesses from speaking on the subject of their
testimony. More speech would thus reach the public arena, making
the case-specific alternative more palatable under the First Amendment.
A second possible criticism of the judicial order alternative is
that it is more narrowly tailored than the statute only because it is
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more content discriminatory. Reliance on judicial orders could
pose an even greater risk of content discrimination than the
statute's restriction on speech related to criminal trials because
judges could unilaterally determine what information could and
could not be released to the public. For example, a judge could
restrict the sale of testimony exposing police misconduct but permit
the sale of testimony incriminating defendants.
The Supreme Court is sharply divided on whether a statute that
restricts certain forms of expression generally is more or less
repugnant under the First Amendment than an individually directed
order which, despite restricting less speech overall, permits discrimination against the message sought to be communicated by the
individual subject to the judicial order. 74 This ambiguity, however, is of minimal relevance under the First Amendment because,
although the relative degree of content discrimination brought
about by a generally sweeping statute versus an individually directed
judicial order is subject to debate, both types of restrictions are
content based, and thus both are subject to the same strict scrutiny.
The Court has never formulated a sliding scale test whereby a more
discriminatory state action must be deemed more narrowly tailored
or assessed under "stricter" scrutiny. Rather, once the Court
determines that a speech restriction is content based, it applies the
same strict scrutiny standard. Under this strict scrutiny standard,
both the statute and the judicial order would be deemed content
based. The statute, however, would also be considered grossly
overbroad because it suppresses speech in many instances in which

14 TheJustices' diverging views on this subject were recently explicated in Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). The majority, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, maintained that injunctions, even when they are content neutral,
"carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general
ordinances" and, therefore, should be subject to a slightly more rigorous standard
than the "time, place, and manner" analysis the Court would employ in evaluating a
comparable ordinance of general applicability. Id. at 2524. Justice Stevens, on the
other hand, argued in a dissenting opinion that injunctions generally follow from
some violation or threatened violation of law, and so "should be judged by a more
lenient standard than legislation." Id. at 2531 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Finally,Justice
Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, contended
that injunctions, even when content neutral, should be assessed under the same
standard as content-based legislation-the strict scrutiny standard. See id. at 2538
(ScaliaJ., dissenting). Scalia offered three reasons for this conclusion: injunctions
may be used to target particular ideas for suppression; injunctions are the "product
of individual judges" who may bear some ill will toward the parties at whom their
injunctions are directed; and injunctions are procedurally more difficult to challenge
than statutes. See id.
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no threat of prejudice threatens the protections afforded by the
Sixth Amendment. Thejudicial order approach, on the other hand,
would be viewed as narrowly tailored because it restricts speech only
to the extent necessary to preserve Sixth Amendment concerns.
Thus, despite the opportunity for content discrimination inherent
in judicial orders, this alternative permits175narrow tailoring, allowing
it to survive constitutional examination.
A third possible objection to this proposal is that it would be
more difficult to administer than a statutory ban. The proposal
would indeed require judges to invest time and resources in
deciding whether to issue "no-payment" orders in individual cases
and in monitoring compliance with outstanding orders. Still, the
administrative inconvenience should be negligible. Only a small
percentage of cases would attract the amount and kind of attention
that would justify such concerns about excessive prejudicial
publicity; most of these could be cured with mechanisms other than
restraints in speech.1 76 Hence, a judge would rarely find it necessary to resort to an order of this kind.
Moreover, a ban would not be self-executing. Judges would still
be charged with determining whether a particular witness had
violated the California statute. It would be easy to imagine
ambiguities that a witness could exploit to evade penalties under the
statute, such as whether the compensation she received from a
media outlet was compensation for her story or for another
purpose, 177 whether she knew or reasonably should have known
that the event or occurrence she witnessed was a crime, 178 or

whether she knew or should have known that she would be called as
175 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (holding that a governmental
objective "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of the legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.").
For more recent cases in which the Court has formulated the strict scrutiny
standard in terms of the least restrictive means test, see Sable Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Government may... regulate the content of

constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest."); Burson v.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1857-58 (1992) (applying this test and upholding a
restriction on political speech near polling places).
76
' See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (enumerating mechanisms that

can cure most threats to fair-trial rights without resorting to speech restrictions).
'77

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) (proscribing payment for information).

"78 The statute is not applicable if an individual does not know, and should not

reasonably know, that the event or occurrence she observed was a crime. See id.
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a witness. 17 9 Thus, whether the state's approach to regulating the
harms associated with checkbook journalism is a categorical
statutory restriction or a case-by-case deployment ofjudicial orders,
there will be some added costs in terms of judicial administration.
Any marginal increase that might accompany a case-by-case
approach is well justified by the lesser affront to First Amendment
rights it entails.'

III. ALTERNATIVES COMPORT WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT RATIONALES

This Part demonstrates that the suggested alternative means of
achieving the statute's ends,"' in addition to being more congruent with contemporary First Amendment doctrine, also better
comport with the traditional policies and rationales underlying the
First Amendment.

A. Cross-Examination
Allowing witnesses to sell what they please to the media and to
be thoroughly cross-examined and impeached for doing so is
consistent with the marketplace of ideas rationale of the First
Amendment.' 82 Rather than prohibiting a witness from injecting
information into the arena of public debate via the media, the
marketplace of ideas rationale would advocate exposing falsifica79

' The statute is not applicable if the individual does not know, and should not
reasonably know, that she may be required to participate as a witness in a criminal
proceeding. See id.
"o See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1017
(1995) (rejecting government's argument defending a total ban because "a wholesale
prophylactic rule is easier to enforce than one that requires individual ...
determinations" and holding that a "blanket burden on the speech of nearly 1.7
million federal employees requires a much stronger justification than the Government's dubious claim of administrative convenience").
A final possible criticism ofjudicial orders is that clever tabloids will find ways
around them. For example, they might temporarily "hire" witnesses eager to sell their
stories at very high wages, disguising payments for stories amidst other transactions.
Alternatively, following Playboy's lead in the Jim Bakker case, they might make
package deals which putatively pay witnesses only for pictures of the witness, claiming
that the interview was uncompensated. Seesupra note 18. Judicial orders prohibiting
witness payment would indeed be subject to this kind of manipulation and evasion,
but no more so than the statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(f) (prohibiting
witnesses from receiving payment for one year after criminal act or, if prosecution is
commenced, until final judgment is reached).
"'l See supra part II.C.
182 See supra part I.B.1 (explaining the marketplace of ideas rationale).
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tions or exaggerations by a further exchange of ideas. If the story
a witness tells the media is inconsistent with or more sensational
than the story she tells in court or in other proceedings, that fact
will be brought to the jury's attention."' 3 Likewise, if a witness's
various accounts are fully consistent, and she displays other signs of
trustworthiness, the jury will be made aware of that too. In short,
permitting witnesses to sell their stories and to be cross-examined
and even attacked for doing so will more likely promote the idea
that truth will ultimately prevail than will a total ban on checkbook
journalism.
The practice of checkbook journalism might initially appear to
have little to do with another leading justification for the First
Amendment: the self-governance rationale. On further reflection,
however, important aspects of the self-governance rationale are at
stake. This theory contends that a state can truly operate as a
democracy only if it protects all political speech implicating matters
of public concern, so that citizens can make informed choices about
the ends the state will pursue and the means by which it will pursue
them. 184
Much of what witnesses sell to media organizations, despite the
tabloid format in which it appears, is fundamentally political speech
of great public concern. California's checkbook journalism law
prohibits disclosure of information pertinent to a legitimate public
desire to assess how well the judicial system works.18 5 Recent
events have compounded the usual public concern for the criminal
i The MichaelJackson investigation provides a good illustration. Defense lawyers
and prosecutors both recognized that witnesses' statements to the media about
Jackson's conduct were inconsistent with and more sensational than their statements
in depositions. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at Al.
s See supra part I.B.2 (explaining self-governance rationale).
5The Supreme Court has acknowledged the obvious fact that the public has a
legitimate interest in monitoring the criminaljustice system. See Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989) (noting that information about the commission and
investigation of a violent crime is a "matter of paramount public import"); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("The operations of the
courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.");
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966) (noting that the major purpose of the First
Amendment is "to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"). The public's
great concern with issues of criminal justice is evident from numerous polls. See
Victims' Rights Expanded, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1994, at ClI (documenting the
overwhelming majority of voters who voted to expand victim's rights); David
Zucchino, PoliticalPreoccupationwith Crime Isn't New, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.
8, 1994, at 43A (discussing how today's extensive media coverage of violent crimes
has created great public awareness of criminal justice).
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justice system, leaving it "poised for systemic criticism" and ready
"to take political arms" in response to perceptions of unjust
results.' 8 6 The public may be interested in hearing the kind of
information that a witness in a criminal proceeding might sell, so
that it can compare the evidence available in a case with the
evidence adduced at trial and with the verdict ultimately produced
by the system.
In many instances, discrepancies between the
evidence in the public arena and the evidence admitted at trial are
attributable to legal rules such as the evidentiary rule against
hearsay 87 and the exclusionary rule,'88 which often exclude
relevant evidence. The scope and operation of the legal rules which
should govern our system of justice, the self-governance theory
would assert, is precisely the kind of political decision in which the
people in a democracy ought to participate. '"
Allegations of misconduct by public officials provide another
example of how the statute could stifle important political speech.
Suppose that a witness possesses information confirming suspected
malfeasance on the part of a public official. The witness may likely

" Richard Parker, The Coming Legal Backlash, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 20, 1995, at
21, 22 (anticipating that an acquittal or hung jury in the O.J. Simpson trial will
generate an intense political response to perceived failings of the criminal justice
system). A new book by Professor George P. Fletcher shows that the public is
becoming increasingly discontented with the workings of the criminal justice system
and increasingly determined to overhaul it. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITHJUSTICE
FOR 8SOME
(1995).
7
' See FED. R. EVID. 801.
188 See

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (mandating the application of the

exclusionary rule in state courts). Reform of the exclusionary rule has been the
subject of recent legislative debate in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. SeeJeffrey Rosen, Search and Seizure, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1995, at 12, 13
(examining bills being debated in both houses and arguing that the Senate bill is
"coherent in theory," but the House bill is "literally unintelligible"). The House
version, expanding the scope of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,
has already been passed. See Nancy Mathis, Warrantless Searches Receive House's
Approval, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 9, 1995, at Al.
..
9See supra part I.B.2 (discussing the self-governance rationale). It is virtually

impossible to predict the impact on the public debate of the evidence unearthed and
disseminated because of checkbook journalism. On one hand, publicity about
inculpatory evidence that was excluded from trial could create political pressure to
relax exclusionary evidentiary rules. On the other hand checkbook journalism could
help illustrate, for example, the dangers inherent in hearsay testimony, bringing to
light the rationality of our current rules in a way that the public would not otherwise
appreciate. Whatever checkbook journalism's ultimate effect on public opinion,
allowing it to continue, as opposed to banning it, will give the public an opportunity
to formulate ideas about the legal system on the basis of a fuller spectrum of
information and thus, according to the self-governance theory of the First Amendment, to make their decision in the most informed and democratic way.
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feel some duty to make the information known, but because of the
inconvenience, loss of privacy, and political risk involved with
dealing with the press and, specifically, condemning a public
official, she may decide not to offer the information to the press.
With a financial incentive, she may be inclined to bear the inconvenience and risk and to share the information. Under the California
statute, however, our hypothetical witness would be unable to accept
the financial incentive and therefore would remain silent, depriving
the public of information of great concern.
After the conclusion of the investigation, the witness could again
accept monetary inducements to report her knowledge to the
media. 9 In some instances, however, delay in the dissemination
of speech results in the loss of the opportunity or desire to
speak. 1 ' That effective loss of the opportunity to disseminate the
information could occur where, after a long investigation, law
enforcement authorities do not uncover any evidence to corroborate
the allegations of official misconduct and are forced to dismiss all
charges against the official. With the investigation terminated, the
witness would again be free to sell the story to the press, but after
the lengthy, fruitless investigation, the public's concern over the
charges would likely have dissipated, leaving the witness with no
media outlet interested in paying for the information. The
California statute's financial restrictions on the dissemination of
certain types of speech would have permanently deprived the public
of information of public concern involving the integrity of their
elected officials, in derogation of the self-governance rationale
underlying the First Amendment.
"gUnder the California statute, the individual is precluded from accepting any

monetary compensation to report her knowledge for one year, unless either no
prosecution is commenced or, if a prosecution is commenced, until a finaljudgment
is reached. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(d).
" The Court has noted, "[d]iscussion that follows the termination of a case may

be inadequate." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 346 (1946); see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[W]hen an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly,

if it is to be considered at all."); Carrol v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
182 (1968) ("The present case involves... 'political' speech in which the element of
timeliness may be important."); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
61 (1975) ("[lt is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted on
our society when we stifle the immediacy of speech."); Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory
of PriorRestraint: The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 33 (1981) ("Although one
can never be certain about the impact of delay, it is possible that on some occasions
persons who lose control over the timing of their utterances thereby lose their desire
to speak.").
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Alternatively, suppose authorities decided to bring charges
against the official. Suppose further that the same witness possesses
several pieces of second-hand circumstantial evidence incriminating
the official, but, again, without financial incentive, concerns of
convenience, privacy, and political retaliation make her hesitant to
speak to the press. Even if she is called as a witness, most of her
testimony would be excluded as hearsay from both the trial and,
consequently, from the trial's press coverage, effectively eliminating
her speech from the public debate. The loss of this witness's
allegations would be a loss of fundamental political speech.
Although the hearsay allegations would have been properly excluded
from the criminal trial, many citizens would find the allegations
relevant to their decisions as voters, and the voters have a right to
withhold a vote from a candidate, even if their concerns cannot be
confirmed beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute would have
effectively removed considerations of possible misconduct from the
public debate, depriving the electorate of what it would consider
valuable information." 2 By proscribing the sale of this kind of
information, the checkbook journalism law eliminates from the
public sphere more than just gossip and scuttlebutt. It frustrates
what the Supreme Court has described as the primary purpose of
the First Amendment: "an unfettered interchange of ideas for the
193
bringing about of political and social changes."
B. Judicial Orders
Because they would burden expression much less frequently
than the statute, judicial orders are more compatible with both the
marketplace of ideas and the self-governance theories of the First
Amendment. Judicial orders will prohibit witnesses from selling

2

The checking rationale, like the self-governance rationale, is a theory of the

First Amendment based on the concept of representative government. It differs from
the self-governance theory in that it believes "the role of the ordinary citizen is not
so much to contribute on a continuing basis to the formation of public policy as to
retain a veto power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain
bounds." Blasi, supra note 65, at 542. Blasi maintains that "the abuse of official
power is an especially serious evil" and that the check on public officials "must come

from the power of public opinion, which in turn rests on the power of the populace
to retire officials at the polls, to withdraw the minimal cooperation required for

effective governance, and ultimately to make a revolution." Id. at 539. It is clear
from these quotations that the statute is at odds with the basic principles of the
checking rationale of the First Amendment. See id. at 527-42.

" New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
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information relating to criminal proceedings only when a court has
found that other measures will not adequately prevent extensive
consumption by the public of prejudicial information, whereas the
statute prohibits witnesses from selling this kind of information
even when there is little or no threat of prejudicial publicity.
Judicial orders will thus allow more speech to reach and be tested
in the marketplace of ideas than will the statute. They will also
facilitate the democratic process better than the statute by permitting more speech on public issues to come to people's attention.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment each embody
fundamental constitutional guarantees, which can come into direct
conflict when a criminal trial is attended by sensationalized and
prejudicial publicity. Because the Constitution provides no insight
into whether either of these rights can ever trump the other, the
Supreme Court has long sought to balance them "without essentially
abrogating one right or the other."'9 4 The California statute, by
failing to achieve a close nexus between the end of securing fair
trials and the means by which it pursues this goal, abrogates free
speech rights in many instances in which doing so is unnecessary.
The use of alternatives such as cross-examination, which protect the
integrity of the trial process without suppressing speech, combined
with exceptional measures such as judicial orders, which can be
employed in especially difficult cases and calibrated to restrict no
more speech than necessary, will ensure that more information of
public concern will enter the marketplace of ideas, leading to more
informed and educated decision-making by the electorate.

19 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 612 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).

